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                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
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________ 
 
OPINION 
________ 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge 
 
 John J. Koresko, V (“Koresko”) appeals several rulings from the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania regarding Appellee Secretary of Labor’s 
(“Secretary”) enforcement action against Koresko and related entities for breach of 
fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”). The District Court found that Koresko breached fiduciary duties he owed to 
employee welfare benefit plans under ERISA. We will affirm the following District 
Court rulings: (1) the August 3, 2012 order granting partial summary judgment in favor 
of the Secretary; (2) the September 16, 2013 order appointing a temporary independent 
fiduciary; (3) the February 6, 2015 opinion imposing liability on Koresko for breach of 
fiduciary duty; (4) the March 13, 2015 order imposing final judgment on Koresko; and 
(5) the May 13, 2015 order denying Koresko’s motion for a new trial.1 We will also 
dismiss Koresko’s appeal of the Court’s August 4, 2015 order appointing a permanent 
independent fiduciary because we lack jurisdiction to review it.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Since we write only for the benefit of the parties, we set forth only those facts 
necessary to inform our analysis.2 This appeal arises out of a suit brought in March 2009 
                                              
1 Koresko’s arguments on appeal do not discuss each of these rulings. To the extent 
Koresko has not discussed why a particular ruling was improper, we deem him to have 
abandoned and waived the issue on appeal. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1993).   
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by the Secretary against Koresko and several entities he controls in connection with a 
multi-employer employee death benefit program. (App. 1184–88). Koresko and his 
brother Lawrence Koresko ran an “unincorporated association of unrelated employers 
called the Regional Employers Assurance Leagues” (“REAL,” “League”), which offered 
employee welfare benefit plans, including death benefit plans, to employers through the 
REAL Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (“REAL VEBA”) Trust. (Id. at 
8).3 Participating employers executed an adoption agreement in order to join the League 
and subscribe to the trusts. (Id. at 9); see, e.g., (id. at 465).4  In joining the League, 
employers agreed to be bound by the governing documents including the Master Trust 
Agreement, Plan Document, and their individual adoption agreement. (Id. at 9–10). 
PennMont Benefit Services, Inc. (“PennMont”) was the administrator of the plans; 
Koresko is the president and CEO of PennMont. (Id. at 11, 138). Employers who joined 
the League could select the type and amount of benefits to offer and set eligibility 
requirements for employees. (Id. at 9). Eligible employees of adopting employers could 
                                                                                                                                                  
2 The District Court conducted an extensive review of this case in granting the Secretary 
partial summary judgment and in its opinion following a bench trial against Koresko. 
(App. 8–22, 97–251).  
 
3 This case also involves the Single Employer Welfare Benefit Plan Trust (“SEWBPT”), 
which Appellant acknowledges is essentially identical to the REAL VEBA Trust. (App. 
139); (Appellant’s Br. 7 n.1) (“The operative documents of the Trusts are essentially 
identical, as are their structural arrangements.”). Our explanation of the REAL VEBA 
Trust applies to the SEWBPT as well. The REAL VEBA Trust and SEWBPT are referred 
to collectively as “trusts.”   
 
4 The participating employers’ individual employee welfare benefit plans are referred to 
herein as “plans.” The employers who joined the League and executed adoption 
agreements are referred to as “adopting employers.”  
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then participate in the benefit program. (Id.). The trusts consisted of employer 
contributions, which the adoption agreements require, and life insurance policies taken 
out on the lives of participating employees to fund the benefits. (Id.). Benefits were then 
paid according the adopting employers’ individual adoption agreement and the governing 
documents for the trust. (Id. at 9–10).   
 The suit brought by the Secretary was against Koresko, several companies he 
owned, the trusts, an employee of Koresko, and the trustees. (Id. at 1185–88). The 
Secretary alleged a breach of fiduciary duties with respect to many individual employee 
welfare benefit plans. (Id. at 1195–202). In August 2012, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (McLaughlin, J.), granted the Secretary partial summary 
judgment with respect to three specific plans. (Id. at 81–82). The Court proceeded to 
remove Koresko from his positions of authority with respect to the trusts, and appointed a 
temporary independent fiduciary to administer the plans and trusts in September 2013. 
(Id. at 1448–455). The District Court then conducted a three-day bench trial that 
concerned additional employee welfare benefit plans. This resulted in a memorandum 
opinion in February 2015 that detailed Koresko’s violations of ERISA. (Id. at 97–322).5 
The Court found that at least 419 employee welfare benefit plans were ERISA-covered 
plans. (Id. at 156, 257).6  The Court entered judgment in accordance with this opinion in 
                                              
5 The nature of Koresko’s breach of fiduciary duties is not at issue on appeal, therefore 
we will not discuss the extent of his ERISA violations.  
 
6 As discussed infra, under federal regulations, employee welfare benefit plans in which 
there are no non-owner employees are exempt from ERISA coverage. 29 C.F.R. § 
2510.3-3(b). Therefore, this calculation is based on the number of plans the District Court 
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March 2015, ordering the permanent removal of the fiduciaries. (Id. at 323–28). The 
Court also ordered Koresko to pay restitution and disgorgement of the remaining diverted 
assets. (Id. at 323). Koresko’s motion for a new trial was denied by the Court in May 
2015. (Id. at 329). Koresko timely appealed. (Id. at 1).7    
 After Koresko appealed the Court’s March 2015 order, the Court issued an order 
on August 4, 2015 appointing a permanent independent fiduciary. (Id. at 1621–22). In 
addition to appointing a permanent independent fiduciary, the Court required that 
Koresko bear the costs of the fiduciary’s appointment. (Id. at 1631). The Court stated: 
“[h]ad the Koresko Defendants complied with their fiduciary duties, there would be no 
need to appoint an Independent Trustee in this case.” (Id.). The costs of the appointment 
would initially be paid from trust assets. (Id.). The Court retained jurisdiction in order to 
enforce the order and explained that it would “issue a separate order specifying the total 
amount the Koresko Defendants are liable to the Plans to restore on account of this 
appointment.” (Id.). Appellant also appeals this order. (Id. at 1616).     
II. AFFIRMANCE DISCUSSION8 
                                                                                                                                                  
found that included at least one non-owner employee. (App. 156). The Court concluded 
that the plans at issue in this case are employee welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA 
and that Koresko was a fiduciary with respect to these plans. (Id. at 99–100).  
 
7 Koresko is the only party appealing.    
 
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Our review of the district court’s interpretation of ERISA 
is plenary, while the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.” Mack 
Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial Consultants of N.J., 930 F.2d 267, 
270 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).   
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 Appellant argues on appeal that the District Court erred by finding that: (A) trust 
assets are plan assets for purposes of ERISA application; (B) a 2009 amendment to the 
Plan Document eliminating non-owner employees was invalid; (C) Koresko was not 
entitled to an advancement of defense costs; and (D) Koresko must restore the alleged 
depletion of assets of the trusts. We reject all of these arguments for the following 
reasons.   
 A. Trust assets are ERISA plan assets  
“ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees 
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.” Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 
610 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). ERISA applies to “employee benefit plans,” 
which may be either employee pension benefit plans or employee welfare benefit plans. 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). This case involves employee welfare benefit plans, which the 
statute defines as:   
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter 
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, 
or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or 
is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their 
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise . . . benefits in 
the event of . . . death . . . .  
Id. § 1002(1). The District Court concluded that the master REAL VEBA plan, a multi-
employer program, is not a “plan” under ERISA. (App. 26). However, the Court found 
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that individual employer-level plans joining the master REAL VEBA plan are ERISA 
plans. (Id. at 27). 9      
 We must decide whether the employer-level plans are ERISA plans in order to 
determine whether or not Koresko owed fiduciary duties to these plans. ERISA “defines 
‘fiduciary’ not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and 
authority over the plan.” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993). The statute 
provides that “a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises 
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan 
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets.” 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i). In other words, a person may be a fiduciary with respect to a 
plan even if the person is not named as a fiduciary in plan documents, “to the extent . . . 
he . . . exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its 
assets.” Sec’y of Labor v. Doyle, 675 F.3d 187, 200 (3d Cir. 2012) (alterations in original) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We recognize 
the difference between the two clauses set forth above in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i), 
“that discretion is specified as a prerequisite to fiduciary status for a person managing an 
ERISA plan, but the word ‘discretionary’ is conspicuously absent when the text refers to 
assets.” Srein v. Frankford Trust Co., 323 F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bd. of 
Trs. of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local 6 of N.J. Welfare Fund v. Wettlin Assocs., 
Inc., 237 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 2001)) (hereinafter Bricklayers). We have emphasized 
                                              
9 The Court also found that the plans of adopting employers who joined the SEWBPT 
were ERISA plans. (App. 252).   
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this distinction, “[n]oting that the ‘statute treats control over the cash differently from 
control over administration’ . . . [and] that ‘any control over disposition of plan money 
makes the person who has the control a fiduciary.’” Bricklayers, 237 F.3d at 273 (quoting 
IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 The Secretary has primarily relied on the second clause of § 1002(21)(A)(i) to 
argue that Koresko is a fiduciary, even though he lacked discretionary authority or 
control over management of the plans and he was not named a fiduciary in the plan 
documents. The District Court found, and the parties do not dispute, that Koresko 
exercised control over the disposition of the assets of the individual employer-level plans. 
(App. 61–67, 269–70). As explained above, this basis for attaching fiduciary status is 
authority or control over “plan assets,” therefore, fiduciary status attaches to Koresko to 
the extent of the employer-level ERISA plans’ assets. See Doyle, 675 F.3d at 200. In 
order to find that Koresko violated his fiduciary duties in this case, we must determine 
that the plans’ assets include the assets in the master trusts. 
  1. Determination of plan assets  
 “The term ‘plan assets’ is not comprehensively defined in ERISA or in the 
Secretary’s regulations.” Id. at 203. ERISA provides that “‘plan assets’ means plan assets 
as defined by such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42).  
These regulations “define the scope of ‘plan assets’ in two specific contexts: (1) where an 
employee benefit plan invests assets by purchasing shares in a company, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2510.3–101, and (2) where contributions to a plan are withheld by an employer from 
employees’ wages, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–102.” Doyle, 675 F.3d at 203. The second 
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regulation does not apply in this case, and while the District Court relied primarily on 
property rights in its analysis, the Court’s conclusion “found support” in the first 
regulation, discussed infra. (App. 59–60, 264–65).         
 The District Court relied on “ordinary notions of property rights under non-ERISA 
law” to determine plan assets, an approach we set forth in Secretary of Labor v. Doyle. 
675 F.3d at 203; (App. 50, 263); see In Re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(approving this approach by explaining that “the definition of ‘asset,’ . . . is that the 
person or entity holding the asset has an ownership interest in a given thing, whether 
tangible or intangible”). We explained that this approach is consistent with guidance 
provided by the Secretary that “the assets of a plan generally are to be identified on the 
basis of ordinary notions of property rights under non-ERISA law. In general, the assets 
of a welfare plan would include any property, tangible or intangible, in which the plan 
has a beneficial ownership interest.” Doyle, 675 F.3d at 203 (quoting Department of 
Labor, Advisory Op. No. 93–14A, 1993 WL 188473, at *4 (May 5, 1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit has expanded on the term “beneficial 
interest” by approving the Secretary’s explanation set forth in a Department of Labor 
opinion letter:        
Whether a plan has acquired a beneficial interest in particular funds 
depends on “whether the plan sponsor expresses an intent to grant such a 
beneficial interest or has acted or made representations sufficient to lead 
participants and beneficiaries of the plan to reasonably believe that such 
funds separately secure the promised benefits or are otherwise plan assets.” 
Kalda v. Sioux Valley Physician Partners, Inc., 481 F.3d 639, 647 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Department of Labor, Advisory Op. No. 94–31A, 1994 WL 501646, at *3 (Sept. 
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9, 1994)). We agree with the Eighth Circuit that this agency interpretation is entitled to 
some deference. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  
 In relying on ordinary notions of property rights to determine whether the plan has 
acquired a beneficial interest in particular funds, we begin by “consult[ing] the 
documents establishing and governing the plan.” Doyle, 675 F.3d at 204. “[T]hen, in light 
of these documents, [we] consult contracts to which the plan is a party or other 
documents establishing the rights of the plan.” Id. The District Court properly considered 
the Plan Document, the Master Trust Agreement, and applicable adoption agreements, 
which established and governed the individual employer-level plans when they joined the 
trusts. (App. 51–52, 264). These documents make clear that legal title to the trust is 
vested in the trustee only. For example, the Master Trust Agreement to the REAL VEBA 
trust provides:  
Title to the Trust Fund shall be vested in and remain exclusively in the 
Trustee and neither the Adopting Employer, Advisory Committee Plan 
Administrator, nor any employee, or his or her decedents or beneficiaries 
shall have any right, title or interest therein or thereto. Participation in the 
Plan and this Trust shall not give any employee, beneficiary or any other 
Person, any right or interest in the Plan or this Trust other than as herein 
provided.  
(Id. at 1117). Neither the plans, the employers, nor the beneficiaries may claim legal title 
over the trust property, which consists of the employer contributions and life insurance 
contract proceeds.  
 This is where Appellant disagrees with the District Court’s approach, as Appellant 
contends “the question was—or should have been—answered: the Trustee owns the 
assets in the Trust and the employer-level plans have no interest therein.” (Appellant’s 
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Br. 16). The Court, however, found that “the inquiry does not end there,” and continued 
to find that “[a]lthough the documents do not confer legal title to the REAL VEBA trust 
assets on the Plans, they manifest an intent to confer a beneficial interest on participating 
plans.” (App. 52). As explained above, welfare plan assets include property in which the 
plan has a beneficial ownership interest. Doyle, 675 F.3d at 203. The District Court found 
that “the assets in the REAL VEBA Trust are held in trust for the exclusive benefit of the 
participating employees and beneficiaries of employers that adopt the REAL VEBA 
benefit arrangement.” (App. 53–54); see also (id. at 265) (“Because the 419 covered 
plans have an undivided beneficial interest, that means they have an interest in all of the 
assets in the REAL VEBA or SEWBP Trust . . . .”).  
 We agree with the District Court and rely on ordinary notions of property and trust 
law. While trustees have legal title and a non-beneficial interest in trust assets, 
beneficiaries of a trust have an equitable or beneficial interest. “A trust may be defined as 
a fiduciary relationship in which one person holds a property interest, subject to an 
equitable obligation to keep or use that interest for the benefit of another.” Amy Morris 
Hess, George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees, 
The Law Of Trusts and Trustees § 1 (2015); see In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 997 F.2d 
1039, 1059 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he classic definition of a trust [is that] the beneficiary has 
an equitable interest in the trust property while legal title is vested in the trustee.”); 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 42 (explaining that the trustee has a “non-beneficial 
interest” in the trust assets). The governing documents make clear that employees as plan 
participants are to be considered beneficiaries under the master plan. The Master Trust 
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Agreement for the REAL VEBA trust provides that “[t]he Trustee will hold the funds 
contributed to it by the League in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of all Employees 
covered under the Plan.” (App. 1113); see (id. at 1127) (similar language in the Master 
Trust Agreement for the SEWBPT). The Master Trust Agreement continues:  
This trust is established . . . for the purpose of receiving contributions of the 
Adopting Employers and their employees to provide . . . benefits to the 
employees and beneficiaries hereunder or payment of insurance premiums 
or making such other similar payments pursuant to the terms of the Plan. 
All contributions, and all assets and earnings of the Trust are solely the net 
earnings of the Trust and shall not in any manner whatsoever inure to the 
benefit of any person other than a Person designated as an employee or 
beneficiary of an Adopting Employer under the terms of the Plan. 
(Id. at 1115); see (id. at 1128) (similar language in the Master Trust Agreement of the 
SEWBPT); see also (id. at 54) (providing other examples in the plan documents “that the 
trust corpus and income shall be used for the exclusive benefit of participating employees 
and their beneficiaries”). Furthermore, the qualification in the Master Trust Agreement 
for the REAL VEBA Trust, that “[p]articipation in the Plan . . . shall not give any 
employee, beneficiary or any other Person, any right or interest in the Plan . . . other than 
as herein provided” allows these interests to exist. (Id. at 1117) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, we agree that the employees and plan participants have a beneficial interest in 
the trusts. 
 Appellant argues that while employer-plan participants may be beneficiaries under 
the trust, the employer-level plans themselves are distinct from plan participants and have 
no interest, beneficial or otherwise, in the trust. (Appellant’s Br. 17–18); (quoting 
Merrimon v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 758 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2014)) (“It is the 
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beneficiary, not the plan itself, who has acquired an ownership interest in the assets . . . 
.”). Appellant’s argument that employer-level plans do not have a beneficial interest in 
the trusts’ assets directly contradicts guidance from the Department of Labor. The 
Secretary has issued opinion letters discussing the extent to which trust assets may be 
considered ERISA plan assets:  
In the Department's view, a plan obtains a beneficial interest in particular 
property if, under common law principles, the property is held in trust for 
the benefit of the plan or its participants and beneficiaries, or if the plan 
otherwise has an interest in such property on the basis of ordinary notions 
of property rights. Further, whether a plan has acquired a beneficial interest 
in definable assets depends, largely, on whether the plan sponsor has 
expressed the intent to grant such a beneficial interest or has acted or made 
representations sufficient to lead participants and beneficiaries of the plan 
reasonably to believe that such funds separately secure the promised 
benefits or are otherwise plan assets. The identification of plan assets 
therefore requires consideration of any contract or other legal instrument 
involving the plan, as well as the actions and representations of the parties 
involved. 
Department of Labor, Advisory Op. No. 99-08A, 1999 WL 343509, at *3 (May 20, 1999) 
(footnote omitted). The first sentence in the paragraph above from this opinion letter is 
particularly applicable: “a plan obtains a beneficial interest in particular property”—that 
is, the employer-level employee welfare plans obtain a beneficial interest in the trust 
property—“if, under common law principles, the property is held in trust for the benefit 
of the plan or its participants and beneficiaries.” Id. (emphasis added). It is clear based 
on the governing documents that the property in the trusts is for the benefit of the plans’ 
participants and beneficiaries. Therefore, the plans have a beneficial interest in trust 
property. The Secretary did not distinguish property held in trust for the benefit of the 
plan itself from property held in trust for the plans’ participants and beneficiaries. 
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Appellant’s proffered distinction reads as a rather transparent attempt to evade ERISA 
liability. Such liability would also seem applicable here considering Appellant has 
previously represented that ERISA governs the trust.10 Because the employees have a 
beneficial interest in the trust, we believe the employer-level plans, in which employees 
are plan participants, also have a beneficial interest in the trust property. 
  2. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–101(h)(2) 
 We agree with the District Court’s analysis that this regulation supports the 
conclusion that the employer-level plans include trust assets. The regulation provides:  
When a plan acquires or holds an interest in any entity (other than an 
insurance company licensed to do business in a State) which is established 
or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing any benefit described 
in section 3(1) or section 3(2) of the Act to participants or beneficiaries of 
the investing plan, its assets will include its investment and an undivided 
interest in the underlying assets of that entity.  
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–101(h)(2). Comments to this regulation state that “assets of 
entities . . . that are established for the purpose of providing benefits to participants of 
investing plans would include plan assets. This provision was intended to apply primarily 
                                              
10
 The District Court noted that while it did not base its decision on judicial estoppel, 
Koresko has successfully argued before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania that a “similar or identical employee benefit arrangement” was a welfare 
benefit plan governed by ERISA. (App. 35 n.15); see REAL VEBA Trust v. Sidney 
Charles Mkts., Inc., No. 01-4693, 2006 WL 2086761, at *1–3, *6 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 
2006). Although Koresko argued in this case to the District Court that the REAL VEBA 
trust is distinguishable, the Court did “not see how the issue of ERISA coverage differs 
between the two cases.” (App. 35 n.15). In addition, the record includes a summary plan 
description which a participating employer gave to employee participants that states: 
“This Plan is covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”) which was designed to protect employees’ rights under benefit plans.” (App. 
1157). These representations suggest that Koresko originally understood that these plans 
were properly governed by ERISA.        
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to so-called ‘multiple employer trusts.’” Final Regulation Relating to the Definition of 
Plan Assets, 51 Fed. Reg. 41262-01, 41263 (Nov. 13, 1986). This regulation is not 
directly on point, as there is no indication that employers joined the trust or established 
employer-level plans for the purpose of investing assets. See Doyle, 675 F.3d at 203 
(describing this regulation as “where an employee benefit plan invests assets by 
purchasing shares in a company”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–101).  
 The purpose behind the regulation and the provided example of its application, 
discussed below, are relevant and insightful to our analysis. The regulation appears 
concerned with complex arrangements, usually investments, in which the manager of a 
welfare plan would no longer owe fiduciary duties to the plan because the investment 
structure positions him to be in an indirect relationship to the plan. Final Regulation 
Relating to the Definition of Plan Assets, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41263. It would frustrate the 
“broad functional definition of ‘fiduciary’ in ERISA if persons who provide services that 
would cause them to be fiduciaries if the services were provided directly to plans are able 
to circumvent the fiduciary responsibility rules of the Act by the interposition of a 
separate legal entity between themselves and the plans.” Id. The regulation itself provides 
the following example: 
A medical benefit plan, P, acquires a beneficial interest in a trust, Z, that is 
not an insurance company licensed to do business in a State. Under this 
arrangement, Z will provide the benefits to the participants and 
beneficiaries of P that are promised under the terms of the plan. Under 
paragraph (h)(2), P's assets include its beneficial interest in Z and an 
undivided interest in each of its underlying assets. Thus, persons with 
discretionary authority or control over the assets of Z would be fiduciaries 
of P. 
16 
 
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–101(j)(12). Despite the fact that this example presupposes that the 
plan acquires a beneficial interest in a trust, the explanation is unmistakably clear that 
where a trust provides benefits to participants and beneficiaries of a plan, “persons with 
discretionary authority or control over the assets of [the trust] would be fiduciaries of [the 
plan].” Id. Koresko had control over the disposition of plan assets, and undoubtedly the 
trust provides benefits to participants and beneficiaries of the employer-level plans. The 
interposition of a multi-employer trust, in which legal title is held by the trustee, does not 
serve to divest Koresko of his fiduciary responsibilities to beneficiaries of the trust.  
 This Court has established that if an ERISA plan has a beneficial interest in 
property, this interest is sufficient to render the property “plan assets” under ERISA. 
Doyle, 675 F.3d at 200. The distinction Koresko advances between the plan itself and its 
beneficiaries contradicts persuasive authority from the Secretary and frustrates the broad 
functional definition of “fiduciary.” See Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 
F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is to be broadly 
construed.”). For the foregoing reasons we agree with the District Court that the 
individual employer-level employee welfare benefit plans have a beneficial interest in the 
trusts, and therefore the assets of the trusts are “plan assets” within the meaning of 
ERISA.     
 B. The 2009 Amendment   
17 
 
 The governing documents of the plans allow the League, “in its sole discretion,” to 
amend the Plan Document. (App. 454).11 The League in turn is REAL, the fictitious 
entity consisting of Koresko and Lawrence Koresko, which adopting employers join in 
adopting the plan. (Id. at 139, 1114). Appellant argues that the 2009 REAL VEBA and 
SEWBPT Amendment of Trust and Incorporated Plan Documents (“2009 Amendment”) 
eliminated benefits to non-owner employees, and therefore the employer-level plans were 
no longer covered by ERISA. (Appellant’s Br. 21–22); see (App. 1216–17). We agree 
with the District Court and hold that the 2009 Amendment was invalid.  
 As previously noted, federal regulations provide that an “employee benefit plan” 
under ERISA does not include “any plan, fund or program . . . under which no employees 
are participants covered under the plan.” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b); see also Yates v. 
Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 21 (2004) (“Plans that cover only sole owners or partners and their 
spouses, the regulation instructs, fall outside [ERISA’s] domain.”).12 The 2009 
Amendment provides: “No benefits shall be paid to or on account of any claimant, 
person, participant, or former participant . . . classified as a non-owner-employee, or to 
any beneficiary of any such [non-owner employee].” (App. 1216). Appellant argues that 
because the plans no longer have any non-owner employees, they cannot be governed by 
                                              
11 The Plan Document “governs the benefit arrangement” and is incorporated by each 
adopting employer. (App. 9, 141).  
 
12 This regulation also provides “[a]n individual and his or her spouse shall not be 
deemed to be employees with respect to a trade or business . . . which is wholly owned by 
the individual or by the individual and his or her spouse.” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c)(1). 
Some of the plans at issue in this case were determined by the District Court to not be 
governed by ERISA because of this regulation. (App. 153–56).  
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ERISA. Nevertheless, the District Court found “undisputed record evidence” that each of 
the plans at issue originally included at least one non-owner employee. (Id. at 36). 
  The District Court provided two reasons why the 2009 Amendment was invalid. 
First, the Court found that Koresko, Lawrence Koresko, and PennMont lacked authority 
to amend the plan under its governing documents. (Id. at 37–39). Second, the Plan 
Document prohibited the 2009 Amendment by disallowing amendments that create 
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees, officers, or stockholders. (Id. 
at 39). The Court supported its conclusion with a policy argument, that it would be 
inconsistent with the purposes of the statute to allow an ERISA-covered employee 
welfare benefit plan to avoid enforcement of ERISA provisions by issuing a subsequent 
amendment. (Id. at 40).  
 Appellant rebuts the District Court’s findings and argues that the 2009 
Amendment was properly executed. We agree with both of the District Court’s findings 
and therefore determine that the 2009 Amendment was invalid.  
 ERISA requires that employee welfare benefit plans “be established and 
maintained pursuant to a written instrument.” 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). The written 
employee benefit plan must “provide a procedure for amending such plan, and for 
identifying the persons who have authority to amend the plan.” Id. § 1102(b)(3). 
“Employers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any 
time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. 
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). However, “whatever level of specificity a 
company ultimately chooses, in an amendment procedure or elsewhere, it is bound to that 
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level.” Id. at 85. “[A]n amendment is ineffective if it is inconsistent with the governing 
documents.” Depenbrock v. Cigna Corp., 389 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 935–36 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also Confer v. 
Custom Eng’g Co., 952 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Only a formal written amendment, 
executed in accordance with the Plan’s own procedure for amendment, could change the 
Plan.”).  
  1. Lack of Authority  
 Regarding the District Court’s first finding, we agree that Koresko, his brother 
Lawrence, and PennMont lacked authority to amend the plans. Appellant acknowledges 
that the governing documents allow the League to amend the plans. (Appellant’s Br. 22) 
(citing App. 454). Appellant continues that the Master Trust Agreement defines “League” 
as “REAL” and he signed the amendment “as Attorney in Fact for all Participating 
Employers.” (Id.); (App. 1114, 1221). The argument follows that because Koresko signed 
on behalf of the participant employers, the participant employers are collectively REAL, 
and the Master Trust Agreement defines “League” as “REAL”—Koresko was authorized 
to sign the 2009 Amendment. Our rejection of this convoluted argument does not 
“elevate[] form over substance.” (Appellant’s Br. 23). Rather, Koresko’s argument 
ignores the unambiguous language of the governing documents. The League “in its sole 
discretion” may amend the Plan Document. (App. 37, 454). The 2009 Amendment was 
an amendment to the benefit structure in the Plan Document. (Id. at 1216–17). With the 
number of related entities and organizations in this case and under the governing 
documents, it is essential that amendments to the plan be executed specifically as 
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authorized under the governing documents. The governing documents simply do not 
authorize Koresko as attorney in fact for all participating employers to amend the plan.13  
 Similarly, the governing documents do not allow PennMont or Lawrence Koresko 
to amend the Plan Document.14 Appellant argues that provisions in the governing 
documents delegate League authority to PennMont as Plan Administrator, “for 
administering the Plan” and “for plan administrative services.” (Appellant’s Br. 23–24) 
(citing App. 460, 1122); (App. 1131). This argument fails as none of the provisions 
delegating authority to PennMont include authorization to amend the plan. The role of 
plan administrator or the delegation of plan administrative services does not 
automatically entail the authority to amend the plan. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 
489, 505 (1996) (stating “it may be true that amending or terminating a plan (or a 
common-law trust) is beyond the power of a plan administrator (or trustee)—and, 
therefore, cannot be an act of plan ‘management’ or ‘administration’”); accord Bins v. 
                                              
13 The Plan Document also allows employers “the right to amend the [b]enefit structures 
in [the plans] from time to time, and to amend or cancel any such amendments.” (App. 
454). Koresko does not argue that his authority to amend the plan stems from this 
provision despite the fact that he signed “as attorney in fact for all participating 
employers.” (Id. at 1221). Therefore, we deem him to have waived reliance on this 
provision. See Kost, 1 F.3d at 182. Even if he had properly raised this argument, 
however, the Plan Document allows employers, and not the attorney in fact for all 
participating employers, the right to amend the benefit structures in the plans. (Id. at 454, 
1221); see Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 85 (“[W]hatever level of specificity a 
company ultimately chooses, in an amendment procedure or elsewhere, it is bound to that 
level.”).  
 
14 Although PennMont is authorized to amend the Master Trust Agreement for the 
SEWBPT, the 2009 Amendment eliminating non-owner employees is specifically an 
amendment to the Plan Document. (App. 1137, 1216). The Plan Document does not 
allow PennMont to amend its terms.   
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Exxon Co. U.S.A., 220 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The act of amending, or 
considering the amendment of, a plan is beyond the power of a plan administrator and 
thus is not an act of plan management or administration.”). The governing documents, 
both in describing the Plan Administrator’s duties and in specifying amendment 
procedures, do not provide PennMont with the authority to amend the plans. Further, 
Appellant’s argument that his brother Lawrence was authorized to amend the plan 
because he was “the League” is insufficient. (Appellant’s Reply Br. 4). Lawrence 
Koresko did not sign on behalf of the League and did not mention the League in 
executing the amendment, therefore he also lacked authority to amend the Plan 
Document.   
  2. Discriminatory Amendment  
 We also agree with the District Court’s second finding that the Plan Document 
prohibits this type of amendment. The Plan Document provides: “no amendment shall . . . 
[c]reate or effect any discrimination in favor of Participants who are highly compensated, 
who are officers or [sic] the Employer, or who are stockholders of the Employer.” (App. 
454–56). The District Court found that eliminating non-owner employees from benefits 
violates this prohibition. (Id. at 39–40). Appellant does not dispute that the 2009 
Amendment violates this provision. Rather, Appellant argues that this provision was 
intended to exempt the arrangement from federal income tax, and that the plan sponsor 
may choose at any time to terminate tax-exempt status and become a taxable 
organization. (Appellant’s Br. 24–25).  
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 Appellant’s argument ignores the importance of adhering to procedures for 
amending a plan. The Secretary is correct that in order for Koresko’s argument to 
succeed, he would have had to show that he amended the plan to remove this provision 
before executing the 2009 Amendment, “otherwise, the discrimination provision remains 
in conflict with [the 2009 Amendment].” (Appellee’s Br. 35). The 2009 Amendment did 
not specifically eliminate the original provision or mention the original plan provision, 
but it directly conflicts with the original provision. In adhering to the governing 
documents and the amendment procedure set forth, the 2009 Amendment is invalid 
because it is inconsistent with the anti-discrimination clauses for future amendments.  
 We need not delve into the District Court’s public policy arguments having found 
two reasons why the 2009 Amendment was invalid. We do note that the Supreme Court 
has articulated a purpose behind having written procedures govern making amendments 
to an ERISA plan: “such a requirement increases the likelihood that proposed plan 
amendments, which are fairly serious events, are recognized as such and given the special 
consideration they deserve.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 82. Given the seriousness 
of plan amendments and the explicit directions in the applicable governing documents, 
we have little difficulty in holding that the 2009 Amendment is invalid because it was 
executed without proper authority and is in conflict with existing plan provisions.15     
                                              
15 We agree with the District Court that it is troubling that Koresko sought to avoid 
application of ERISA through this amendment. (App. 40 n.18) (“John Koresko admitted 
at oral argument that one purpose of the [2009] [A]mendment, which he authored, was to 
avoid application of ERISA.”). While we acknowledge that a plan sponsor may amend or 
terminate an ERISA-covered plan, the termination of a plan through an amendment must 
follow the plan’s amendment procedures. See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 
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 C. Denial of defense costs  
 Appellant next contends that the District Court fundamentally erred and violated 
indemnification provisions set forth in the governing documents by denying him the 
advancement of defense costs. (Appellant’s Br. 27–28).  On September 16, 2013, the 
Court ordered that the trusts were barred from advancing defense costs to Koresko. (App. 
1455). Koresko maintains this violates indemnification provisions in the governing 
documents. The Master Trust Agreements for the REAL VEBA Trust and SEWBPT 
provide indemnification for legal fees and expenses, “in advance, unless it is alleged and 
until it is conclusively determined that such Claims arise from the Trustee’s own 
negligence or willful breach of its obligations specifically undertaken pursuant to this 
Agreement.” (Id. at 1120, 1136). Although the Secretary argues that the partial grant of 
summary judgment and subsequent bench trial “conclusively determined” that the claims 
arose from Koresko’s breach of fiduciary duties, we do not rely on this basis to affirm 
this part of the District Court’s order. (Appellee’s Br. 37); (App. 1120, 1136).     
We agree with the District Court that this indemnification provision, or Koresko’s 
reliance on this provision to seek plan assets for advancement costs, is in violation of 
ERISA. The statute provides that “any provision in an agreement or instrument which 
                                                                                                                                                  
F.2d 1155, 1162 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that employers do not have “unfettered 
discretion to amend or terminate plans at will”). In distinguishing Delgrosso v. Spang & 
Co., 769 F.2d at 935–36, a case in which we held that a company breached its fiduciary 
duty by failing to administer a plan pursuant to the governing documents, we noted in 
Hozier that “the particular amendment at issue in Delgrosso was invalid under the terms 
of the unamended plan’s governing documents.” Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1161 n.6. 
Appellant’s reliance on Hozier for the proposition that he could decide at any time to 
terminate an ERISA plan is therefore unwarranted.  
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purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, 
obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1110(a). The Department of Labor has interpreted this statute to  
render[] void any arrangement for indemnification of a fiduciary of an 
employee benefit plan by the plan. Such an arrangement would have the 
same result as an exculpatory clause, in that it would, in effect, relieve the 
fiduciary of responsibility and liability to the plan by abrogating the plan's 
right to recovery from the fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary obligations.  
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (interpretive bulletin). Indemnification provisions are allowed if 
they “merely permit another party to satisfy any liability incurred by the fiduciary,” such 
as liability insurance. Id.  Plan indemnification provisions that allow the plan to 
indemnify a fiduciary are considered void. See Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 
1079–80 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Thus, ‘[i]f an ERISA fiduciary writes words in an instrument 
exonerating itself of fiduciary responsibility, the words, even if agreed upon, are 
generally without effect.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting IT Corp., 107 F.3d at 1418); 
Perelman v. Perelman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 512, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (explaining that the 
indemnification provision does not violate ERISA because “it permits the Trustee to seek 
indemnification only from the employer and does not permit indemnification by the 
Plan”).    
 Appellant urges this Court to follow Harris v. GreatBanc Trust Co., No. 
EDCV12-1648-R (DTBx), 2013 WL 1136558 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2013). In Harris, the 
court found an indemnification agreement valid under ERISA because it expressly 
prohibited indemnification if a court entered a final judgment from which no appeal 
could be taken finding breach of fiduciary duties. Id. at *3. Appellant argues the same 
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result as in Harris should apply here, because the Master Trust Agreement provides for 
indemnification “unless it is alleged and until it is conclusively determined that such 
Claims arise from the Trustee’s own negligence or willful breach of its obligations 
specifically undertaken pursuant to this Agreement.” (Appellant’s Br. 29–30) (citing 
App. 1120, 1136). Thus, Appellant argues that the indemnification provision complies 
with ERISA because it similarly does not allow for indemnification if Appellant is found 
to have violated fiduciary duties.  
 In addition to not being binding authority, the indemnification provision in Harris 
is distinguishable. In Harris, the provision required Sierra Aluminum, the sponsor of an 
employee stock ownership plan, to indemnify GreatBanc, the trustee of the plan. 2013 
WL 1136558, at *1. This did not violate ERISA because, as discussed above, per 
guidance from the Department of Labor, indemnification provisions that “merely permit 
another party to satisfy any liability incurred by the fiduciary” are permissible. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2509.75-4. The Department of Labor allows a trustee to seek indemnification from 
another party, as long as the indemnification does not come from the plan itself. Unlike in 
Harris, in this case, Koresko was seeking advancement costs from the plans themselves, 
not another party. This would effectively “abrogate[e] the plan's right to recovery from 
the fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary obligations.” Id. Although Koresko could have 
relied on liability insurance or indemnification through another party, he could not rely 
on plan assets to front his legal costs. We agree with the District Court order denying 
Koresko from relying on plan assets to cover his litigation costs as a proper interpretation 
of 29 U.S.C. § 1110 and 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4.   
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 D. Damages analysis    
 Koresko contends that the District Court’s damages analysis was “legally 
unsupportable.” (Appellant’s Br. 32). He argues that he should only be required “to 
restor[e] plan participants to the position in which they would have occupied but for the 
breach of trust.” (Id. at 33) (alteration in original) (quoting Perelman, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 
519) (internal quotation marks omitted). Koresko argues that the plans at issue entitled 
beneficiaries to receive certain benefits, and that the District Court’s order that he restore 
the depletion of assets of the trusts would be unnecessary for the plans to pay 
beneficiaries their entitled benefits. (Appellant’s Reply Br. 5–6). ERISA provides that a 
fiduciary who breaches duties owed to a plan  
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan 
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of 
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by 
the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief 
as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.  
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).           
 Appellant’s arguments fail for two reasons. First, as established above, the plans 
have a beneficial interest in trust assets. Koresko’s argument that the Court “confuse[d] 
purported losses incurred by the Trusts with that of the employer-level plans” ignores the 
Court’s finding, which we affirm, that the plans have a beneficial ownership interest in 
the trust assets. (Appellant’s Br. 33). Koresko is not entitled to retain his ill-gotten gains 
because he depleted assets from the trusts and not from the individual plans. As the 
statute requires the fiduciary to return profits to the plan, the District Court properly 
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required Koresko to return profits to the trust, property that the plans have an ownership 
interest in. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).   
 Second, disgorgement of profits is an equitable remedy and therefore allowable 
under the statute. Id.; see S.E.C. v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that disgorgement of profits “is an equitable remedy meant to prevent the wrongdoer 
from enriching himself by his wrongs”); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122 n.17 (7th Cir. 
1984) (explaining that legislative history indicates Congress intended disgorgement of 
profits to be an available remedy for breach of fiduciary duties under ERISA). We have 
explained that “ERISA’s duty of loyalty bars a fiduciary from profiting even if no loss to 
the plan occurs.” Edmonson, 725 F.3d at 415–16; see also Leigh, 727 F.2d at 122 
(“ERISA clearly contemplates actions against fiduciaries who profit by using trust assets, 
even where the plan beneficiaries do not suffer direct financial loss.”). The purpose of 
disgorgement of profits is deterrence, which is undermined if the fiduciary is able to 
retain proceeds from his own wrongdoing. Koresko’s argument that the plans have 
suffered no damages is without merit. The District Court properly ordered Koresko to 
disgorge his profits, and the Court’s damages analysis is supported by the statute. See 29 
U.S.C. § 1109(a).               
III. DISMISSAL DISCUSSION 
 Koresko additionally appeals the District Court’s August 4, 2015 order appointing 
an independent fiduciary and requiring Koresko to pay future costs. We lack jurisdiction 
to review this appeal because the August 4, 2015 order was not a final decision of the 
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District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . .”).  
 A “final decision” is defined as a decision of a district court that “ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” 
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). An order that “finds liability and 
imposes a monetary remedy, but does not reduce that award to a specific figure” will 
usually be considered interlocutory and not a final decision. Century Glove, Inc. v. First 
Am. Bank of N.Y., 860 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 
F.2d 1267, 1276 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that “the norm is that an award . . . which does 
not fix the amount of the award or specify a formula allowing the amount to be computed 
mechanically is not a final decision”) (quoting John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th 
Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have elaborated on an exception to the 
rule that if a judgment does not fix the amount of damages, it is not a final decision:  
However, “even when a judgment fails to fix the amount of damages, if the 
determination of damages will be mechanical and uncontroversial, so that 
the issues the defendant wants to appeal before that determination is made 
are very unlikely to be mooted or altered by it—in legal jargon, if only a 
‘ministerial’ task remains for the district court to perform—then immediate 
appeal is allowed.” 
Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 200 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Prod. & Maint. Emps. Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954 F.2d 1397, 1401 (7th Cir. 
1992)). Appellant contends that only ministerial tasks remain, rendering the District 
Court order a final decision. We do not agree.   
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 We believe the District Court order requiring Koresko to pay future costs incurred 
by the independent fiduciary is not a final decision at this point because the order 
imposed an unquantified and uncertain monetary award without a mechanical 
computation to ascertain these damages. The Court ordered that “[t]he costs of the 
Trustee’s appointment ordered herein will be borne by the Koresko Defendants.” (App. 
1631). The Court did not define “[t]he costs of the Trustee’s appointment” or provide a 
method to calculate these costs. Instead the Court specified that the trustee’s services 
would initially be paid out of trust assets to be later reimbursed by Appellant. (Id.). The 
District Court retained jurisdiction over this case in order to enforce compliance with the 
order and to calculate the costs Appellant will owe to reimburse the plans for paying the 
trustee. (Id.) (“At the close of its appointment, the Court shall issue a separate order 
specifying the total amount the Koresko Defendants are liable to the Plans to restore on 
account of this appointment.”). The Court recognized the complexity of these damages 
and the importance of determining exactly what costs were incurred by the appointment 
of the independent fiduciary. The Court’s contemplation that a subsequent order would 
be necessary to calculate these costs does not evince that “the determination of damages 
will be mechanical and uncontroversial.” Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 200 n.8 (quoting Prod. & 
Maint. Emps. Local 504, 954 F.2d at 1401) (internal quotation marks omitted).     
 Appellant relies on Vitale v. Latrobe Area Hospital as an example of a case in 
which we determined that a district court order was a final decision even though it did not 
specifically fix damages. 420 F.3d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 2005). Vitale is distinguishable 
because in that case we determined “that the benefits calculation required by the District 
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Court would be entirely mechanical” as set forth by a “precise mathematical formula for 
calculating the monthly retirement benefit.” Id. In this case, the calculation of costs is far 
from mechanical or ascertainable, which is why the District Court explained that it would 
issue a separate order specifying the amount Koresko owes. The August 4, 2015 order is 
not a final decision because it did not specify fixed damages or a mechanical method to 
calculate damages. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Brodka, 643 F.2d 
159, 161 (3d Cir. 1981) (“It is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction ‘that where 
liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains undetermined, there is no 
final order.’”) (quoting Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefit Review Bd., U.S. 
Dept. of Labor, 535 F.2d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 1976)).           
 We also agree with Appellee that we lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) for appeals from interlocutory orders pertaining 
to injunctions and receiverships. Further, the District Court order does not fall within the 
collateral order doctrine, which would allow it to be appealed.  
 Although 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) allows appeals from certain interlocutory orders 
pertaining to injunctions, the District Court order is not an injunction because it was not 
“directed to a party” or “enforceable by contempt.” In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 
459 F.3d 383, 392 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Med. & 
Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The order is directed at the newly appointed independent fiduciary, which is not 
a party in this case. Further, because the order does not direct Koresko to pay a specified 
amount, it is not enforceable by contempt. See Santana Prods., Inc. v. Compression 
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Polymers, Inc., 8 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that an order is not injunctive 
because “the order does not compel [a party] to take any action nor does the order restrain 
[the party] from doing anything”). Koresko is not compelled to take any action at this 
point where the court has not yet calculated damages Koresko owes to the plans.        
 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2), we have jurisdiction to review “[i]nterlocutory 
orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to 
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property.” 
The purpose of § 1292(a)(2) is “to relieve the parties from interlocutory orders affecting 
control over property.” Martin v. Partridge, 64 F.2d 591, 592 (8th Cir. 1933); see also 16 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3925 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining 
the purpose behind the statute that “[a] receivership can drastically curtail existing 
property rights, foreclosing independent action and decision in irreparable ways”). The 
concern over property rights, which justifies taking appeals from interlocutory orders 
involving receiverships, does not apply in this case. The August 4, 2015 order did not 
affect the parties’ control over trust property. Koresko lost control over the trusts through 
the Court’s September 16, 2013 and March 13, 2015 orders. (App. 325–27, 1448–52). 
Koresko timely appealed the final judgment in this case, which removed him from his 
position as a fiduciary. (Id. at 1, 325–326). Therefore, the August 4, 2015 order is not a 
receivership order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) because the order did not affect 
Koresko’s control over trust property assets.      
 The collateral order doctrine allows appeals from district court orders that meet a 
“stringent” standard. In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d at 396; (quoting Will v. 
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Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The order must: 
“(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.” Id. at 395–96 (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 349) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Failure to meet any one of the three requirements renders the 
doctrine inapplicable. Id. By its own terms, the August 4, 2015 order does not 
conclusively determine the disputed question because the order states that “the Court 
shall issue a separate order specifying the total amount the Koresko Defendants are liable 
to the Plans.” (App. 1631). The order did not conclusively determine the issue of 
damages in this case and accordingly the collateral order doctrine does not apply.    
 Because we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s August 4, 2015 order, 
we will dismiss the appeal of that order.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the August 3, 2012; September 16, 2013; 
February 6, 2015; March 13, 2015; and May 13, 2015 rulings of the District Court on 
appeal before us and dismiss Koresko’s appeal of the Court’s August 4, 2015 order for 
lack of jurisdiction.     
